Harris on ADA Mediation
On SSRN, Seth Harris has just posted Disabilities Accommodation,
Transaction Costs, and Mediation: Evidence From the EEOC's Mediation
Program, an interesting empirical study. The abstract:
This paper examines whether mediators' job is different and more
difficult when workers and employers are negotiating over a
disabilities accommodation issue as compared with negotiations over
other employment discrimination issues. The mediator's job includes
getting the parties to exchange information, and at times acquire
information, and to accept the new information as relevant to their
expectations about the negotiation's results. This paper focuses on
transaction costs in disabilities accommodations negotiations that
might make this aspect of the mediator's job more difficult.
Specifically, if the information needed in disabilities
accommodations negotiations is more complex, more extensive, and
more closely held by the parties, the mediator's job in those
negotiations will be more difficult.
There are several grounds for speculation that the mediator's role
in disabilities accommodations negotiations is different. First,
workers' rights and employers' responsibilities under the ADA's
accommodation mandate are more ambiguous and contingent than under
most other anti-discrimination statutes. Second, and closely
related, employers may enter negotiations with a bias against
accommodations claims. Third, although common to many negotiations,
bilateral asymmetric information may be a particular problem in
disabilities accommodation negotiations.
Finally, finding an effective and efficient accommodation can be a
vastly more complex undertaking than, for example, calculating and
remedying a discriminatory pay differential or redressing a
discriminatory firing or demotion decision.
Using data from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
mediation program, this paper offers preliminary evidence regarding
differences between disabilities accommodation negotiations and
negotiations over other employment discrimination issues. It offers
an original analysis of a data set constructed by E. Patrick
McDermott and his co-authors from a survey of participants in the
EEOC's mediation program. The participants' responses offer
indirect evidence of differences in the informational transaction
costs that arise in disabilities accommodations negotiations and
negotiations over other employment discrimination issues.
The legal literature identifies three methods that mediators use to
overcome informational transaction costs: (1) mediators improve
information exchange; (2) mediators help to de-bias negotiations;
(3) mediators serve as bridges to information about solutions to
accommodations problems and, in selected cases, propose solutions
that the participants would not or could not propose themselves.
Participants were asked to react to five favorable statements about
their mediators that were reasonable proxies for these techniques.
I found statistically significant, if small, differences between
the responses of participants in disabilities accommodations
negotiations and participants in negotiations over other kinds of
employment discrimination issues. This evidence suggests that
mediators have a more difficult time using these techniques to
overcome transaction costs in disabilities accommodation
negotiations. Thus, because they are harder to overcome, we can
deduce that there is something different about informational
transaction costs in disabilities accommodations negotiations.
The evidence suggests three conclusions about what the differences
are. First, information exchange is more difficult in disabilities
accommodations negotiations. Second, the mediators' role in
proposing solutions and providing information about possible
solutions is more critical to disabilities accommodations
negotiations. Finally, disabilities accommodations negotiations are
more likely to be stalled and frustrated by employers' biases
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